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Multiculturalism, Autonomy,
and Language Preservation
ETHAN NOWAK
University College London
In this paper, I show how a novel treatment of speech acts can be combined with a
well-known liberal argument for multiculturalism in a way that will justify claims
about the preservation, protection, or accommodation of minority languages. The key
to the paper is the claim that every language makes a distinctive range of speech acts
possible, acts that cannot be realized by means of any other language. As a result,
when a language disappears, so does a class of speech acts. If we accept that our social
identities are in large part constituted by the decisions we make about how to speak,
then language loss will amount to a substantial infringement on our autonomy in a
particularly important domain.
1. Introduction
Many philosophers have offered arguments that aim to establish that the diversity
of human cultures is important in one way or another. These philosophers claim
that, other things being equal, we ought to celebrate and attempt to preserve
cultural diversity, or at the very least, that it would not be wrong for us to do so.1
Many linguists and anthropologists, not to mention journalists and laypeople,
have expressed the idea that the diversity of human languages is important in
one way or another. They claim that, other things being equal, we ought to do
what we can to prevent languages from becoming extinct, to document those that
are beyond the point of viability, or at the very least, to lament the diminishing
linguistic diversity that is a fact about our world.2
Contact: Ethan Nowak <e.nowak@ucl.ac.uk>
1. Compare Kymlicka (1989; 1995; 2001), Taylor (1994), Lovett (2010), Jeffers (2015), and
many others.
2. See Day (1985), Sankoff (2001), and King and Haboud (2011) for a sample of aca-
demic work on language loss from different perspectives. Compare Crystal (2000), espe-
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Most of the prominent contributions to the philosophical literature on multi-
culturalism treat the relationship between culture and language as both broad and
deep, and many of those contributions involve arguments that provide reasons
for preserving, protecting, or accommodating minority languages.3 While some
of those reasons are relevant where the phenomenon of language extinction is
concerned, it is surprising how little dedicated attention the phenomenon has
received, especially from philosophers working in what we might think of as
very nearby areas. In the philosophy of language, for example, recent years
have seen a substantial growth in research activity on questions of obvious social
significance, like silencing, slurring, and conceptual engineering, but I am aware
of no work that engages with the topic of language extinction directly. Similarly,
the preservation of historical artifacts, objects of aesthetic significance, biological
species, ecosystems, and much more has been the focus of major research in ethics,
but similarities between these issues and the topic of language extinction, to the
best of my knowledge, have not been explored.
My aim in the present paper will be to show how these diverse perspectives
might be usefully drawn together to make progress on what I imagine most
philosophers will agree is a substantial issue. Instead of attempting a broad
survey of some of the various ways in which the existing literature on multicul-
turalism bears on the issue of language extinction, I will proceed by showing
how a certain prominent kind of consideration that has been adduced in favor of
multiculturalism, when interpreted in the light of some innovative recent work in
the philosophy of language, might be used to justify claims about the preservation,
protection, or accommodation of minority languages.4
The kind of consideration I have in mind is due to Kymlicka (1995), who
argues that cultures provide the agents that live within them the ‘context of
choice’ that makes genuine autonomy possible. After quickly explaining how one
tempting interpretation of Kymlicka’s argument would fail to provide compelling
reasons to care about language diversity, I move on to the positive proposal that
forms the heart of the paper.
My key claim will be that every language makes a distinctive range of speech
acts possible, speech acts that cannot be realized by means of any other language.
cially chapter two, for an overview written for a general audience, as well as Anthony
Woodbury’s ‘Endangered Languages’ for the Linguistic Society of America’s outreach page
at https://www.linguisticsociety.org/content/endangered-languages and Rachel Nuwer’s
‘Why we must save dying tongues’ for the BBC at http://www.bbc.com/future/story/
20140606-why-we-must-save-dying-languages for just a pair of representative popular press
contributions.
3. Compare, for example, Taylor (1994), Patten (2001; 2005; 2009; in press), Kymlicka and
Patten (2003), Levy (2003), Van Parijs (2000; 2003).
4. For an overview of ways in which the literature on multiculturalism connects with the
phenomenon of language extinction, compare my Nowak (in press).
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One immediate result of this is that people who share a language share the
ability to perform and recognize actions of a set of types that non-speakers cannot
perform or recognize. I take this to reveal a sense in which speakers of a common
language share a culture, and thus to reveal a sense in which the preservation,
protection, or accommodation of a language would be the preservation, protection,
or accommodation of a (part of a) culture.
The real significance of the claim that there are language-specific speech acts,
however, is that it can be used to motivate a Kymlicka-style liberal defense of
minority languages. In a nutshell, the argument runs as follows. Since language
is the most fine-grained tool we have for making our inner lives public and for
making our personalities manifest in a way that other agents can recognize and
engage with, our social identities are in large part constituted by the decisions
we make about how to speak. Those decisions, however, only have the signifi-
cance they do when they are understood against the backdrop of the range of
possibilities (the ‘context of choice’) our language makes available. So, there is
an important sense in which self-determination depends on our having access
to a community of others who speak our language. While I intend the piece
to be taken as a first step rather than a final word, I hope it will go some way
towards stimulating what I expect will be a productive area of common discussion
between philosophers working in language, ethics, and politics.
2. The Context of Choice and Linguistic Determinism
In a series of influential contributions, Will Kymlicka has developed and defended
an argument for multiculturalism that is rooted in the value of individual liberty.
Although Kymlicka’s strategy has attracted criticism from philosophers sympa-
thetic to his conclusion but skeptical about his way of establishing it, as well as
from philosophers who reject both the conclusion and the method, his approach
constitutes one of the major lines of inquiry in a substantial literature.5
Kymlicka’s basic idea is that people’s ability to choose a conception of the
good life and pursue that conception by living in a particular way depends on
something he calls a ‘societal culture’:
A societal culture is an intergenerational community, more or less insti-
tutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a
distinct language and history. (Kymlicka 1995: 18)
In Kymlicka’s view, societal cultures are important because they provide a
‘context of choice’, demarcating and shaping the space of possibilities within
which an agent is able to select the course of her life:
5. Compare Waldron (1991), Okin (1999), Barry (2001), Kukathas (2001), Eisenberg (2003),
Appiah (2005), Scheffler (2007), Patten (2009), and others.
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Liberals should recognize the importance of people’s membership in their
own societal culture because of the role it plays in enabling meaningful
individual choice and in supporting self-identity. . . . Cultural membership
provides us with an intelligible context of choice, and a secure sense of
identity and belonging that we call upon in confronting questions about
personal values and projects. (Kymlicka 1995: 105)
The nature of the possibility space a societal culture makes available is deter-
mined partially by what we might think of as hard facts about the background
time and place in which the culture is located, and partially by facts of a more
obviously social character. So, for example, whether a societal culture makes
commercial fishing a career possibility will depend on facts about geography
and biology, as well as facts about economics and the prevailing views about
fishing. Some cultures might revere fishers, others might afford them no special
regard, still others might consider fishing a great evil. A person’s choice of a
career in fishing will thus amount to something different in different places—a
societal culture, in other words, imbues a career choice (as well as choices about
which hobbies, activities, association memberships, etc. to pursue) with the social
significance it has:
People make choices about the social practices around them based on their
beliefs about the value of these practices. . . . To have a belief about the
value of a practice is, in the first instance, a matter of understanding the
meanings attached to it by our culture. (Kymlicka 1995: 83)
To really do Kymlicka’s argument justice, much more would have to be said
about autonomy and choice themselves, about which cultures should count as
societal, which countervailing factors might tell against the accommodation,
protection, or preservation of a particular culture, how the demands of multi-
culturalism should be weighed against other demands, and so on. For present
purposes, however, we can set these considerations aside. Our aim is not to
establish that Kymlicka’s argument succeeds in showing that we should preserve,
protect, or accommodate societal cultures, but to consider the extent to which
an argument with the same basic structure—an argument based on liberal con-
cerns about autonomy—might provide a reason for preserving, protecting, or
accommodating languages.
Kymlicka himself frequently offers reasons for thinking that languages—at
least in some cases—deserve to be taken seriously in some of the same ways
that societal cultures do. Sometimes, those reasons are presented in explicitly
instrumental terms:
The sort of solidarity essential for a welfare state requires that citizens
have a strong sense of common identity and common membership, so
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that they will make sacrifices for each other, and this common identity is
assumed to require (or at least be facilitated by) a common language and
history. (Kymlicka 1995: 77)
It is not hard to see how this line of thinking might justify certain kinds of
protections or support for minority languages, or indeed, for any language in
need of such (and which was importantly implicated in the preservation of the
social bonds that a societal culture depends on). If a common language is required
to make people stick together in the way they must in order for a societal culture
to persist, then insofar as we care about societal cultures, we have a reason to care
about the languages those cultures depend on.6
Although the characterization of the psychological and sociological facts that
this argument depends on seems plausible enough, my aim here is to show that
deeper reasons can be given for thinking that languages might deserve protection,
preservation, or accommodation. Since I am not concerned to establish that those
deeper reasons are the only reasons in the vicinity, I will set aside questions about
how far this kind of instrumental justification might be taken.7
Kymlicka frequently says things that might be taken to provide a more direct
argument for preserving languages. Consider the following passage, for example,
which draws substantially on some themes from Dworkin:
I noted earlier that societal cultures involve a ‘shared vocabulary of tradi-
tion and convention’ which underlies a full range of social practices and
institutions (Dworkin 1985: 231). To understand the meaning of a social
practice, therefore, requires understanding this ‘shared vocabulary’—that
is, understanding the language and history which constitute that vocabu-
lary. Whether or not a course of action has any significance for us depends
on whether, and how, our language renders vivid to us the point of that
activity. And the way in which language renders vivid these activities is
shaped by our history, our ‘traditions and conventions’. Understanding
these cultural narratives is a precondition of making intelligent judge-
ments about how to lead our lives. In this sense, our culture not only
provides options, it also ‘provides the spectacles through which we iden-
tify experiences as valuable’ (Dworkin 1985: 228). (Kymlicka 1995: 83)
On one natural way of reading this passage, it suggests a straightforward
6. This reasoning parallels an instrumental justification Kymlicka offers for the preservation
of cultures themselves: “Cultures are valuable not in and of themselves, but because it is only
through having access to a societal culture that people have access to a range of meaningful
options” (Kymlicka 1995: 83).
7. It is worth mentioning, however, that if my primary argument is successful, the consider-
ations I rely on will provide a new form of support for this kind of instrumental argument as
well; the special capacities shared by members of a language community would provide a kind
of explanation for the role a language plays in facilitating particularly strong social bonds.
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extension of Kymlicka’s liberal argument for multiculturalism so that it covers
language, too. If “understanding the meaning of a social practice” requires
“understanding the language and history [which underlie it]”, then the space of
life possibilities we may choose between will be at least partially determined by
the language we speak. Someone who did not speak our language would not
be able to appreciate the social significance of the choices we make, and thus
would not be faced with the same options as we are about what kind of life to
live.8 To put the same point another way, if the space of possibilities that a culture
makes available is (partially) constituted by a certain language, then insofar as
we are motivated to preserve, protect, or accommodate the culture, we should be
motivated to preserve, protect, or accommodate the language, too.
Call the foregoing the ‘constitution argument’. An anonymous referee points
out that it is not obvious that Kymlicka himself intended to endorse anything as
strong as the constitution argument. In my own view, the most natural reading of
Kymlicka is a reading on which he endorses quite a strong version of the argument.
For our purposes, however, the exegetical question is less important than the
question of what the constitution argument might show. Because the constitution
argument is likely to occur to many readers—indeed, various formulations of it
appear in nearly all popular writing on the subject of language extinction—and
because the argument I will give in the next section might easily be confused
with it, it will be worth taking a moment now to emphasize some problems the
argument faces.
First of all, we can certainly accept that narratives and meaning-building
are an indispensable part of the framework that makes choice possible without
having to accept that the language spoken by a particular person or people
has anything deep to do with the nature of the narratives in question, or with
anyone’s judgments about the significance of various courses of action. Of course,
there is a sense in which understanding the significance of one’s life choices
requires understanding what Dworkin calls the ‘vocabulary’ of one’s culture and
traditions.9 But treating ‘vocabulary’ in this connection as more than a metaphor,
and thus defending the claim that the particular life choices a given culture makes
available are in an important way shaped by features of a certain language would
require substantial arguments of a sort that, to the best of my knowledge, none of
the participants in this literature have attempted to provide.
It is also important to emphasize that we might perfectly well grant that
understanding a narrative and making judgments requires having a language, or
8. To be clear: the problem here is not that a monolingual French speaker would find our
conversation unintelligible, and thus fail to see what we are talking about. The idea is that even
if the French speaker had access to translations of everything we say, those translations would
leave out something essential to grasping the social significance of our decisions.
9. Taylor (1994) employs a similarly metaphorical characterization of the ‘languages’ of
different forms of human activity.
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at least requires the kind of high-level and abstract thinking about potentially
non-present people, objects, and situations that language is typically supposed to
involve. This, however, is still a very far step from requiring a particular language or
other, which is what would be required for the liberal defense of multiculturalism,
as presented above, to generalize in a way that would support the preservation
(etc.) of any individual language.10
The idea that the particular language we happen to speak shapes our experi-
ence of the world in a deep way has appeared periodically in modern academic
literature in various guises since at least Whorf (1956). Although consensus in
linguistics is as hard to come by as it is in philosophy, most linguists approach
claims about what is often called ‘linguistic determinism’ skeptically, and those
that accept a version of the view typically do so in a very attenuated fashion, in a
very limited domain.
So, for example, while there is some controversy among linguists about
whether the differences in the languages we speak might make some of us
marginally better than others at re-identifying shades of certain colors, there is no
mainstream support for the view that whether you can see red or not depends
on whether your language has an analogue of the word ‘red’ in the lexicon.
While some researchers have claimed that syntactic or lexical differences across
languages produce measurable effects in people’s ways of grouping certain objects
or recalling certain sequences, the significance of these findings has typically been
the topic of great dispute, and none of the putative evidence for determinism
would support the kinds of striking claims Whorf made about languages such
as Hopi and Coeur d’Alene, which he took to provide their speakers ways of
thinking about time, space, causality, and so on that speakers of Indo-European
languages could not readily access.11
Despite the wide variety of areas in which theses of linguistic determinism
have been offered, I am aware of no linguist or philosopher of language who
thinks that the grammar or lexicon of a particular language has a systematic
10. For further discussion of a related version of what is sometimes called the ‘particularity’
argument, see pages 321–323 of the present article. To reframe the point from the body text
in terms of the notion of ‘narrative structure’, it is clear that no one would be in a position to
appreciate the narrative structure of Crime and Punishment if she did not speak a language. But
it is just as clear that appreciating that structure does not require one to speak Russian—the arc
of the story is framed by the relations that obtain between the contents that make it up, not the
particular manner in which those contents are expressed in one language or another. This does
not mean that nothing important about Crime and Punishment is lost when the book is rendered
in a language other than Russian. Indeed, much of my argument will turn precisely on the
sense in which I take it that something significant is lost—not the contents themselves or the
structure they produce, but their mode of presentation. We will return to this point below.
11. For an excellent survey of both the history and the current state of play where linguistic
determinism is concerned, see Gleitman and Papafragou (2005). For accessible discussion of
the problems linguistic determinism faces, see Pinker (1994) and McWhorter (2014).
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impact on the evaluative judgments speakers of the language make.12 General
antipathy to determinist theses probably has a lot to do with this. But there is
a particular worry that would have to be met by anyone who wanted to defend
the kind of far-reaching determinism about language that would be required to
ground the constitution argument: what kind of evidence could they possibly
rely on?
Suppose a certain language has a word for a certain kind of highly specific
evaluative concept. The language is spoken only by people living in a certain
culture, who make judgments about that concept frequently and consider them
important. How should we determine whether the people in question have the
word because they make the judgments, or whether they make the judgments
because they have the word? Insofar as linguistic determinism has been accepted
anywhere, it has been accepted precisely to the extent that it admits of empirical
substantiation. But it is very difficult to imagine an experimental procedure
that might reveal that the way a particular culture regards having a career in
commercial fishing (say) is due to the structure of their language, as opposed to
facts about their location in economic, geographic, cultural, and biological space.
In summary, the heart of the constitution argument is the claim that languages
have a basic role to play in shaping the life choices made available to the people
that live in a particular culture. If this claim were correct, Kymlicka’s liberal
defense of multiculturalism would by itself amount to a defense of the value of
at least some languages, too. State of the art thinking in both linguistics and the
philosophy of language, however, makes this kind of linguistic determinism look
decidedly unappealing. If we want to apply Kymlicka’s liberal argument to the
case of minority languages, then, we will have to look for a different approach.
3. The Outline of a New Liberal Argument for Language Preservation
Kymlicka himself points out a passage from Dworkin that hints at one way his
general argumentative strategy might be adapted:
People need a common culture and particularly a common language even
to have personalities, and culture and language are social phenomena.
We can only have the thoughts, and ambitions, and convictions that are
possible within the vocabulary that language and culture provide, so we
are all, in a patent and deep way, the creatures of the community as a
whole. (Dworkin 1989: 488)
In this passage, something that seems to involve an appeal to linguistic
12. An anonymous reviewer, however, points out that Peled and Bonotti (2016) have recently
approached the topic in political theory, and classic work in the vein of, e.g., Lakoff (1987; 2003)
might be read along these lines, as well.
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determinism of the form just argued against—the claim that “we can only have the
thoughts, ambitions, and convictions that are possible within the vocabulary that
language and culture provide”—is accompanied by two strands of an importantly
different line of reasoning. The first involves the idea that “we are all, in a patent
and deep way, the creatures of the community as a whole” and the second the
notion that we require “a common language even to have personalities”.
Taken in one way, the idea that a person must share a language with other
people in order to have a personality is clearly false. Pre-linguistic children and
non-linguistic adults have personalities, and most pet owners would presumably
say the same about animals. If we read Dworkin’s claim about the connection
between having a language and having a personality in light of the observation
that we are “in a patent and deep way, the creatures of the community as a whole”,
however, we can appreciate another sense of ‘personality’, a sense in which the
claim seems both more obviously correct and also more illuminating. Forget
about whether you need to be the master of a language in order to come to have
the outlook and dispositional tendencies that we normally think of as being part
of your personality. Clearly there is a sense in which you have to have access to a
public language in order to make your outlook and dispositions manifest to those
around you, or at least, to make them manifest in their full richness and splendor.
If you travel to a foreign country where you do not speak the local language,
you may be able to get others to see that you are patient or impatient, generous
or not generous, but all of the fineness of grain that colors your interactions
with people in your mother tongue is lost. Your wit, your tenderness, and your
grace depend on the words you choose as much as they do on your underlying
dispositions where non-linguistic behavior is concerned. There is a sense of
‘personality’, in other words, that is inherently social and that requires not just
that you be a certain way, but that others recognize you as so being.13
The aim of the rest of the paper will be to show how we can turn this
observation into an argument that establishes that having access to a community
of speakers of your native language is a primary good. To preview, the argument
will go like this. The choices we make about how to speak play a fundamental
role in constituting our identities, a role comparable in significance to the role
played by the choices we make about how to live. This is because we are social
creatures, and the choices we make about how to speak are choices that the people
around us take to reflect who we are. The choices we face about how to speak,
however, are choices that are shaped by the particular nature of the linguistic
environment we inhabit; different languages make different ranges of speech acts
possible. So, people who are cut off from a certain linguistic community are thus
deprived of the ability to realize a range of actions they would otherwise have
13. Variations on this theme appear in Taylor (1994) and Appiah (2005), among many
others.
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been able to realize, and thus deprived of the ability to present themselves—and
to be recognized as having done such—in certain ways. This gives us a reason to
seriously consider the measures we might take to guarantee that people are not
cut off from their linguistic communities.
4. Language-Specific Speech Acts
The first step of the argument will be to establish that there are speech acts that
can only be realized in a particular language. To do that, it will be useful to
remember the basic outlines of the philosophical tradition descended from Austin
(1962) and Searle (1975), according to which speech acts can be characterized in
terms of their illocutionary force and their content. The force/content distinction
is meant to reveal both that which is similar across examples like the following,
and that which is different:
(1) The door is closed.
(2) Is the door closed?
(3) Close the door!
Each of (1)–(3) share what in terms of the traditional taxonomy is called a content:
the proposition that is at issue, that is, the proposition that the door is closed.
What differs across the examples is the illocutionary force with which that content
is expressed—in the first example the content is asserted, in the second example
it is queried, and in the third it is commanded.
The force/content distinction has proven to be descriptively useful in a number
of ways. For example, at least at a high level of generality, the distinction makes
it easy to recognize a sense in which a variety of languages make the same basic
types of speech act possible. Consider the following, for example:
(4) La porte est fermée.
(5) Est-elle fermée la porte?
(6) Fermez la porte!
According to the traditional story, since the French sentences (4)–(6) involve the
same force and content as (1)–(3), they can be used to perform speech acts of the
same general type as their English counterparts.
Despite the utility of the force/content distinction, however, there are ex-
planatory projects for which a finer-grained characterization of speech acts is
required. To really understand what a person does with her words often requires
attending to very subtle choices she makes about how to deploy them. In addition
to the force and the content that characterize a certain speech act, fully competent
speakers of a language track a wide range of other features of the words and
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syntactic structures that are used to realize it, features that we might together
think of as determining its mode of realization.14
Conventional Devices
The modal properties of a speech act (in the sense of ‘mode of realization’) depend
on a wide variety of properties that characterize the words and structures used
to realize that act. Sometimes, the words and structures involved conventionally
encode information that determines the mode of realization. One kind of informa-
tion that is frequently encoded concerns the level of politeness. Any competent
speaker of English will recognize that there are important differences between
the following (and endless variations thereupon):
(7) You done with the salt?
(8) Pardon me, but have you finished with the salt?
(9) Would you mind passing the salt this way when you have finished with it?
Each of (7)–(9) has the force of a request. But there is a level of description
at which the speech acts that would normally be realized by means of these
sentences are importantly different. Directed towards Grandmother, (7) may be
insulting, while (9) will not be. Directed towards a colleague, (9) may come off as
obsequious, while (8) will not. While it would be a mistake to identify a speech act
with its effects, these differences in effect are nevertheless the result of differences
in the mode of realization of the speech acts in question.
Of course, English is not unique in allowing speakers to select an appropriate
(or inappropriate, as the case may be) level of politeness. Anyone who speaks
basic French will recognize the difference between:
(10) Passe-moi le sel.
(11) Passez-moi le sel.
(12) Auriez-vous la gentillesse de bien vouloir me passer le sel?
In French, as in English, there are forms of words that are generally recognized to
be more polite and forms of words that are generally recognized to be less polite.
So in French, as in English, the range of speech acts that can be realized where a
certain content is concerned is not limited to, for example, asserting, querying, or
commanding (or any other type at this level of description). Each of those actions
can be realized politely or impolitely, or indeed, at any of a wide variety of points
on a (presumably multidimensional and messy) scale of politeness.
14. I offer a more detailed characterization of mode in Nowak (2018). There are important
similarities between what I call the mode of realization of a speech act and the notion of register
developed in Díaz-Legaspe, Stainton, and Liu (in press).
Ergo · vol. 6, no. 11 · 2019
314 · Ethan Nowak
Although given a token French utterance, it will presumably be possible in
most cases to choose an English utterance that would capture a roughly equivalent
level of politeness, there is an important difference between the two languages
that deserves attention. In French, unlike in English, at least some information
about politeness is explicitly encoded in the lexicon (tu/vous) and in the verbal
morphology (-e/-ez verb endings).
Other languages explicitly mark similar distinctions at an even higher level
of resolution. One of the difficult things about Korean for speakers of European
languages is that Korean verb endings, instead of marking person or number, mark
politeness relationships between the speaker and the addressee, and also between
the speaker and the people about whom she is speaking (if she is speaking about
a third party). The system of endings is very complex, involving perhaps 7 or 9
possibilities depending on how you count. While there is a ‘standard’ ending,
choosing it remains a significant choice where the level of politeness expressed is
concerned.
In keeping with my previously expressed skepticism about linguistic deter-
minism, I should be clear that I do not mean to suggest that French and Korean
speakers sort their interlocutors into categories of respect in a more fine-grained
way than English speakers do.15 Nevertheless, there is something important that
Korean speakers can do—and French speakers to a lesser extent—that English
speakers cannot. They can employ a conventional device that their language makes
available for the express purpose of situating themselves vis-a-vis their interlocu-
tors. Where the level of politeness is concerned, they can (and indeed, must)
haul up a flag, as it were, that is available to every speaker of the language and
immediately recognizable by every speaker of the language.
As Stainton (2016) convincingly argues, and as is brought out nicely in Díaz-
Legaspe et al. (2019), the fact that a certain linguistic operation is conventionalized
in a language allows people to use it to do things with it that were previously
not possible. Here is an example from Pushkin’s 1828 poem Ty i vy, reprinted in
Pushkin (1828/1959), that underscores the significance of this point:
Пустое вы сердечным ты
Она, обмолвясь, заменила
И все счастливые мечты
В душе влюбленной возбудила.
Пред ней задумчиво стою,
Свести очей с нее нет силы;
И говорю ей: как вы милы!
15. Whether they do this or not is an empirical psychological and anthropological question
about which I do not speculate. If native speakers of Korean did sort people using more
categories, it would be a stretch to claim that this sorting would owe its shape to the nature of
the language they speak.
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И мыслю: как тебя люблю! Pushkin (1828/1959)
Although the poem is well-known to Russian audiences, it is not typically
included in collections of Pushkin’s verse that appear in English translation. This
is likely at least in part due to the fact that the entire poem is built around
the scaffolding of a transition between the formal and informal second person
forms of address that cannot be conventionally paralleled in English.16 In the
first line, the lyrical subject’s object of affection (allegedly unwittingly) slips
from the ‘empty’ formal form of address to the ‘heartfelt’ informal. In so doing,
she provokes an emotional transition in the lyrical subject, awakening a rush of
feelings that are reflected back in the form of a parallel transition between forms,
one that the lyrical subject makes public, and one that is kept private.
In English translation, the poem is usually called Thee and you, and is some-
times accompanied by a note that reminds readers that archaic English distin-
guished the formal ‘you’ from the informal ‘thee’. When read in light of that note,
English readers can sort of vaguely see how the structure is meant to work. But
this is like the sense in which it is possible to appreciate why a joke that you
have failed to understand the first time around would have been funny if you had
understood properly. That is not the sense tellers of jokes are after when they tell
jokes, and it is not the sense a poet or a translator would aim for, given the choice.
The gap between the effect the modern English reader understands is meant to be
felt and the effect that is in fact produced by the alternation between ‘you’ and
‘thee’ is presumably what leads translators to fill the final lines with additions
like those reproduced below:
The pale “you are” by warm “thou art”
Through careless slip of tongue replacing
She sent within the love-struck heart
All sorts of happy fancies racing.
I stand before her all beguiled;
I stare at her, and the old Adam
Blurts out: You are all kindness, Madam!
And thinks: God, how I love thee, child! (Pushkin 1828/1999: 75)
While the following French translation is clearly no substitute for Pushkin’s
original, it is worth including here for the sake of comparison:
Elle a remplacé ce “vous” convenu
En laissant échapper un cordial “tu”,
16. It is important to note that the same technique occurs in other work of Pushkin’s, work
of more obviously substantial aesthetic significance. In Nowak (2018), I discuss a similar case
drawn from Evgenii Onegin.
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Et éveillé en mon cœur amoureux
Par ce mot les rêves les plus heureux.
Quand pensivement je suis auprès d’elle,
Je ne puis détacher les yeux de celle
A qui je dis: votre air est si charmant!
Et ces mots signifient: je t’aime tant!17
Instead of some nonsense about Adam and an infelicitous contrast between
‘Madam’ and ‘child’, the French translator can employ a binary distinction between
forms of address that French readers cannot fail to notice, a distinction that is
similar to the Russian distinction. The French translator, in other words, can
do something with her words—slip from vous to tu—and invite the reader be a
witness to that doing, instead of having to explain to the reader in parenthetical
notes what the Russian original does.
This textual example shows how a speaker can exploit the difference between
formal and informal second person forms of address in order to achieve a certain
purpose. The point the example illustrates, however, is a perfectly general one:
languages differ tremendously in terms of the range of conventional tools they
make available, and they differ in terms of the properties and relations those
tools track. Since these differences amount to differences in the space amount
to differences in the space of possible modes of action, this means that different
languages make different speech acts possible.
History of Past Use
Recent work on slurring and pejoration brings out another important way in
which many of the speech acts that are possible in a language depend on highly
particular facts about that language. One answer to the question about what makes
slurs offensive that has attracted significant attention recently is: their history of
past use. Lepore and Stone (2018) and Nunberg (2018), for example, claim that
to be a fully competent user of a slurring expression you have to know not just
that the word is a slur, or know how offensive a slur it is compared to others, but
furthermore know something about the particular historical circumstances from
which the slur’s contemporary use descends.18
For Lepore and Stone, the offensiveness of the anti-Semitic slur ‘kike’, for
example, is bound up with historical facts about anti-Semitism. The history of
anti-Semitic prejudice is probably long enough and vile enough to guarantee that
‘kike’ would be a slur, even if the events of the Holocaust had never taken place.
The fact that the Holocaust did occur, however, is implicated in making speech
17. Unattributed translation retrieved from https://akyla.net/stihi-na-francuzskom/
alexandre-pouchkine/373-alexandre-pouchkine/9257-tu-et-vous-ty-i-vy.
18. Elements of this line can be found in Anderson and Lepore (2013) as well.
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acts realized by means of that expression the speech acts they are. In Lepore
and Stone’s terms, the ‘tone’ of the expression ‘kike’, as used today, reflects the
history of systematic anti-Semitic violence from the middle of the 20th century;
people who use the expression activate that history, and people who encounter
the expression recognize as much.
Nunberg, along similar lines, says that “by affiliating himself with the histori-
cal owners of [a slur], the speaker doesn’t simply evoke the word’s background
but materially obtrudes it into the context” (2018: 62). He illustrates the point
with the following passage from Langston Hughes’s 1940 autobiography:
The word nigger sums up for us who are colored all the bitter years
of insult and struggle in America: the slave-beatings of yesterday, the
lynchings of today, the Jim Crow cars, the only movie show in town with
its sign up FOR WHITES ONLY, the restaurants where you may not eat,
the jobs you may not have, the unions you cannot join. The word nigger in
the mouths of little white boys at school, the word nigger in the mouth of
the foreman at the job, the word nigger across the whole face of America!
Without taking a position on whether this is the best treatment of slurring, or
whether this account should be accepted at the expense of other alternatives, it
is hard to deny that there is something importantly right about it.19 If A uses
the n-word to denigrate B, A does not simply denigrate B, or even denigrate B in
virtue of the way A takes B to be racialized. A denigrates B with a word known
to fully-competent speakers of A and B’s community to have been used by people
who advocated and implemented slavery, lynching, racially-motivated murder,
and so on. There is a clear sense in which someone who is unaware of the history
of the word fails to understand what people do when they use it.
The particular speech act possibilities made available by slurring expressions
provide a powerful illustration of another point that is perfectly general: what
we can do with our words often depends on highly particular facts about their
histories. The point of the example is not to show that slurring is a valuable
form of speech that might deserve protection, but to provide a particularly vivid
illustration of the way in which the history of an expression shapes the space of
speech act possibilities the expression makes possible.20 So, for example, anyone
who says ‘bigly’ in 2018, to use Nunberg’s apt locution, “materially obtrudes”
Donald Trump into the context, whether the speech act involved is ironic satire or
19. For alternative accounts compare Potts (2007), Hom (2008), Richard (2008), Jeshion
(2013), DiFranco (2015), and others.
20. Thanks to an anonymous referee for emphasizing the need to be clear about this. The
referee’s comment led me to see a potential connection between slurring, however, and a
linguistic phenomenon that might indeed prove valuable: reclamation. I hope in future work to
be able to explore the phenomenon of reclamation through the lens of the approach to speech
acts and social identity that I have sketched here.
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loving imitation. Facts about the distribution of uses of ‘bigly’ are now, for better
or for worse, facts about English, and we can leverage mutual knowledge of them
to do things when we speak that we previously could not have done.
Feature Overlap
Before moving on to consider what the upshot of these considerations should
be, it will be worth taking a look at one more class of examples, in order to
see how the possible courses of action that a word or other linguistic element
makes available typically depend not just on a single feature of the sort we have
looked at so far—like conventional status, or history—but on the particular way
in which a large number of those features happen to overlap. This fact makes
the cross-linguistic variation in possible speech acts much greater than it would
otherwise be.
Here is a case Lepore and Stone mention, but do not discuss in detail. Andrew
O’Hehir, writing for Salon.com on November 17, 2015, offers the following take on
the word ‘niggardly’:
Should we stop using the adjective “niggardly,” because it accidentally
resembles another word?
That one is instructive, in a way. Along with roughly 100 percent of
the media, I thought that controversy was ludicrous when it came up
in the late ‘90s and early 2000s: If we consult the dictionary, we learn
that “niggardly” can be traced back to Middle English and Old Norse,
and has no etymological connection to the racial slur. But I have to say
that my perspective has since shifted. We pretty much have dumped that
word, because it is so easily misunderstood and other words will do, and
also because it carries a permanent taint: The only person who would
conceivably use it now would be a snickering, anti-p.c. asshole trying to
make an obnoxious point.
Suppose you are watching a televised debate with a friend who does not
speak English. One of the parties to the debate, a nationalist candidate, uses the
word ‘niggardly’ to describe his opponent’s approach to veteran’s affairs. You
snort derisively. Your friend, who is reading along with subtitles, is surprised
and asks why. While it might be right, at high level of generality, to say that the
speaker has done something offensive, that response would not quite explain your
reaction. Of course, in some contexts, derision might be an appropriate reaction
to an offensive behavior—we might expect a certain level of decency from public
figures, and take them to be worthy of scorn when they fail to live up to the
expected standard by saying offensive things.
In this case, however, there is really more to the story. Speakers with the
highest degree of competence in English will recognize not simply that the speech
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act realized was offensive, but that it was offensive in a highly particular way—in
precisely the way a liberal listener would expect from a “snickering, anti-p.c.
asshole trying to make an obnoxious point”.21 In virtue of what do we recognize
this? Your friend, surprised at the specificity of a description like this, might
point out that the subtitles offered only ‘My opponent’s treatment of our veterans
has been ungenerous’, which seems perfectly neutral.
At some level of description, the translator has gotten things right. The speech
act in question is an assertion. Its content is precisely the content reported by the
translation. The translation misses out, however, on a constellation of properties
that are tagged in the metadata associated with ‘niggardly’, metadata that fully-
competent speakers are familiar with, and which fully-competent speakers exploit
when speaking and interpreting one another. O’Hehir does a good job tracking
many of the relevant properties in the passage quoted above; one is that ‘niggardly’
is an extremely low frequency and antiquated expression, another is that it is
phonetically uncomfortably similar to the n-word. More subtly, but no less
importantly, there is the fact that we have other words in English that we can use
to express the truth-conditional contribution ‘niggardly’ would express.22
Of course, contra the claims that might be made by defenders of the wilder
forms of linguistic relativism, all of this information could be imparted to someone
who did not know English. Sometimes, in fact, subtitles will feature explanations
of jokes or innuendos that depend on phonetic features of the target language,
or register facts, or that exploit other kinds of linguistic metadata. As was
underscored in our discussion of poetry, however, explaining how something is
done is a fundamentally different thing from actually doing it. In order to be
offensive in exactly the way the politician who says ‘niggardly’ is offensive—to
be offensive by deploying a word that looks and sounds like the n-word and is
almost never used because of that fact, but which means what ‘miserly’ does—you
21. Importantly, I am not saying that the negative evaluation of the speaker on the part of
the interpreter is entailed by the speech act in question. The nationalist candidate’s supporters
will detect in his speech a refreshing openness, a tweaking of the nose of the politically correct
opposition. The important thing to notice here is that part of competence with English is
knowing about the metadata associated with the lexical items and syntactic structures of
English. So regardless of what you think of this act, you recognize the difference between it
and the variation that would have been realized had ‘niggardly’ been replaced with ‘miserly’,
or whatever. The liberal listener and the nationalist listener can disagree about whether the
point is obnoxious or not, but they will both recognize that it involves a transgression.
22. It is important to be clear that the key idea here is that the identity of the speech act
is determined by the precise set of overlapping features of various sorts associated with the
words used to realize it. Many of those features will be tagged in the metadata, as facts about
history, register, and so on are. But what we might think of as the basic facts about the content
of the word are just as important. If ‘niggardly’ had meant what ‘regally’ means, the example
might not work the way it does. The positive evaluative valence of ‘regally’ might defeat the
invocation of the n-word.
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have to be speaking English.
Interim Conclusion: Different Languages Make Different Speech Acts Possible
To draw the threads that have been discussed so far in this section together, there
are many reasons for thinking that facts about the manner in which a speech
act is realized—facts that matter where the question ‘what kind of speech act
was this?’ is concerned—are often facts that depend on the idiosyncrasies of a
particular language. In other words, people exploit the particular architecture of
the conventional devices their language makes available, together with mutually-
known facts about the history of an expression, its similarity in sound, meaning,
and other properties to other expressions, and so on, to do different things while
speaking. While a translation of the expressions used in the original might
preserve some of the features that made an act the act it was, there are many
cases in which important properties of a piece of discourse—properties that help
to determine which speech acts it might be used to realize—will not survive
translation. While there may be an expression available in the language in which
the translation is rendered that matches the original expression in terms of its
content, say, or even content and register, there will not always be an expression
that is a feature-for-feature analogue where the full range of features associated
with an expression is concerned.
5. The Importance of Language-Specific Speech Acts
In the previous section, we saw that it is impossible for someone speaking English
to do what a French speaker does by shifting from vous to tu during a conversation.
We saw that someone who is not speaking English cannot use the n-word to
activate the historical background of violence and oppression that gives the word
its status in English.23 And we saw how the speech act possibilities a language
makes available typically depend not just on one, but on a constellation of features.
These examples, and arbitrarily many others we could generate along the same
lines, show that the particular nature of the language a person speaks plays a
basic role in determining the space of possible speech acts that she can realize. To
borrow Kymlicka’s locution, the examples reveal a sense in which the language a
person speaks provides her with a ‘context of choice’. Not in Kymlicka’s sense
of the range of life plans presented to an agent, but in a more local sense that is
nevertheless—as I will argue here—just as significant where our social identities
are concerned.
23. Again, to be clear, the point here being not that this is a valuable thing to be able to do,
but that slurs reflect how the speech acts a language makes available depend on its particular
history.
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If French and English should disappear, speech acts that exploit particular
constellations of features that obtain only in French or English would become
unrealizable. If we want to show that the disappearance of a class of speech acts
is problematic from the point of view of autonomy, however, we need a reason for
thinking that it should be important that those speech acts in particular remain
among the range of viable options available to some group of speakers.
The challenge here parallels a well-known objection to Kymlicka’s liberal de-
fense of multiculturalism: someone might accept that genuine autonomy requires
the context of choice societal cultures provide, while denying that this amounts
to a reason to preserve any particular culture or other. Individual agents might
still count as properly autonomous, according to the objector, as long as they each
had access to some societal culture or other, and thus to some suitably-varied set of
alternatives about how to live. (Individual speakers would still count as properly
autonomous, on the version of the argument that is at issue for us here, as long as
they each had access to some language or other, and thus to some suitably-varied
set of speech act alternatives.)
While a fully-detailed consideration of the ways in which the liberal multi-
culturalist might answer this worry would take us too far afield, there are two
lines of response that are particularly well-connected with our current inquiry.
The first essentially boils down to the claim that as a matter of psychological fact,
adults cannot simply trade one culture for another. The second points out that
for most people, elements of their heritage culture play such a fundamental role
in contributing to their conception of themselves that they would not want to
trade their culture for another even if they could. By adapting these two lines
and weaving them together, we can make a compelling case for caring about the
preservation of the particular range of speech acts a particular language makes
available.
Patten (2009) describes a version of the ‘change is too hard’ argument that
explicitly connects the questions of cultural and linguistic preservation. In order
to avoid getting bogged down in questions of the sort Waldron (1991), Scheffler
(2007), and others raise about how to delineate societal cultures (and how, thus,
to tell which sets of practices might have a claim to protection), Patten suggests
that the multiculturalist think of language as a sort of vehicle for accessing the
range of life choices a certain culture makes available:
We might say that a language corresponds to a “societal culture” when
a monolingual speaker of that language can find in her community an
adequate context of choice. To say that there is a Francophone societal
culture in Quebec, for instance, is to say that a French speaker in Que-
bec has access to an adequate range of options operating in the French
language. To say that there is no Italian-speaking societal culture in the
United States, by contrast, would be to deny that an Italian speaker in
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that context has an adequate range of Italian-language options. To enjoy
personal autonomy, an Italian-speaker in the United States must learn
English and access the English-language societal culture that dominates
the country. (Patten 2009: 16–17)
If we accept Kymlicka’s basic claim about the sense in which cultures make
choices available, and if we think about language in the way Patten suggests, then
the empirical facts about language acquisition may give us a reason to preserve
languages:
If a person’s societal culture is deteriorating, it may not be feasible for
her to learn a new language associated with a healthier societal culture.
For adults at least, learning new languages is a costly and difficult propo-
sition, one for which success is not always guaranteed. In practice, the
disintegration of a societal culture may leave some of its members without
an adequate context of choice—just as Kymlicka argues. If minority lan-
guage rights can prevent such disintegration from occurring—by raising
the status of a minority language at risk—then there would seem to be a
rationale for such rights that liberals should take seriously. (Patten 2009:
18)
The question of whether this strategy will ultimately be successful in any
given case depends both on general facts about how hard it is for adults to learn
a new language and on specific facts about the range of life options available to
certain people in a certain place at a certain time. Where the general facts about
language acquisition are concerned, my understanding of the situation on the
ground is decidedly less pessimistic than Kymlicka or Patten’s. If the standard of
speaking a language is that of being able to participate in public life—as many of
the contributors to this literature seem to hold—or of being able to avail oneself
of a suitably wide range of the life options that are available in a certain place
to those who speak the local language natively, then it seems to me that most
normal adults will be able to meet that standard without unreasonable effort.
Instead of speculating further along these lines, however, I want to offer what I
take to be a largely sympathetic way of recasting Patten and Kymlicka’s argument.
In my view, the ‘change is too hard’ argument can be made much stronger if
we approach language proficiency from the perspective I have advocated in
the present paper. Suppose that instead of thinking of the sphere of autonomy
that we are concerned with as the sphere of possible ways that someone might
choose to live her life, we think of it as the sphere of possible speech acts that is
typically available to a speaker speaking her native language. If that is the level of
proficiency required for someone to count as having ‘switched’ languages, then we
have a much better reason to think that few people would be able to attain it. To
speak a language well enough to run a business or work productively is—it seems
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to me—fairly easy. To speak a language fluently is harder. To speak a language
totally idiomatically, to be able to deploy the full range of registers, intonations,
colloquial references, and so on that native speakers employ, is something that
adults are not frequently capable of.
Native speakers of a language, whether gifted orators or George W. Bush,
nearly effortlessly manage a huge range of signals beyond those that contribute
to the basic informational content associated with the words they use. By means
of those signals, they do all sorts of subtle things, positioning themselves socially
in various fine-grained ways, establishing and flouting hierarchies, seeking to
build rapport and accepting or rejecting others’ attempts, and so on. If we ask:
‘Can most people learn a second language well enough to more or less live a free
life?’ then the answer, it seems to me is clearly ‘yes’ and so we find no obvious
reason here to care about protecting their native language. If, on the other hand,
the question we ask is: ‘Can most people learn a second language well enough to
have roughly the same facility a native speaker does in deploying the language
with a full knowledge of all the shades and layers of significance that are wrapped
up in the messages she is sending?’ then the answer I think is much more clearly
‘no’.24
This brings us to the second of the argument strands mentioned above. Kym-
licka, drawing on Margalet and Raz (1990), cites the fundamental role cultures
play in establishing a person’s identity in order to show how switching cultures
is not a live option for people whose culture is under threat:
Cultural membership has a ‘high social profile’, in the sense that it affects
how others perceive us and respond to us, which in turn shapes our self-
identity. . . . If a culture is not generally respected, then the dignity and
self-respect of its members will also be threatened. (Kymlicka 1995: 89)
What Kymlicka says here about culture is true of language, as well, and perhaps
even more substantially so. While it may well be the case that many people
identify with the language they speak—in Taylor’s (1994) sense of being proud to
be speakers of that language, feeling a connection to other speakers, etc.—there is
a sense in which the language we speak has a ‘high social profile’ for us that, in
my view, far outstrips the significance of our identity qua members of this or that
language group.
As I said in Section 3, drawing on Kymlicka’s invocation of Dworkin, it does
not strike me as an exaggeration to say that the course we chart through speech-act
24. Language is an extremely powerful tool. Even a rudimentary grasp of a language
allows you to do very important things. But it is a tool that really reaches its potential only in
the hands of a master. When wondering whether someone can pick up a new language, we
should not ask whether they can split logs with it, or even build a cabin, but whether they can
carve in filigree. The answer, for most people, in most places, will be ‘no’.
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space constitutes at least a substantial piece of our personality. Language, as I said
before, is the finest-grained tool we have for making our inner selves public, and
for viewing one another as agents who act for reasons, as displaying particular
aesthetic proclivities, as being funny or clever or as being not funny or clever. Our
public selves, the selves that our friends and family are acquainted with, are in
large part the product of the linguistic choices we make. Our linguistic behavior
does not just “affect how others perceive and respond to us”. In a substantial
sense, our linguistic choices constitute the us that others perceive and respond
to.25
Seeing language as the clay, as it were, from which our social identities are
molded brings out how much is at stake here. Even if you could pick up a
new lump—which, for the reasons given earlier in this section, most people
cannot—you simply could not use it to mold the same thing as you can with this
lump. Despite having total control over a second language, people who are fully
bilingual cannot do all of the things in their second language that they can in
their first (and vice-versa). This means that if one language should disappear, or
if a speaker should be cut off from it, having access to another will not prevent
their being cut off from a range of ways of expressing themselves, and thus being
cut off from a range of ways of being.26
By the same token, if there were a way to take the measure of the dignity
provided to a person by the language she speaks, it seems to me that the greater
part would be due not to the fact of speaking this or that language (i.e., not to
the simple fact of group membership), but to the way in which the language she
speaks allows her the fullest possible control over how to present herself.
Anyone who speaks more than one language knows what it is to come across
at different levels of resolution, to be more or less able to maneuver in precisely
the desired way. If English were to disappear from the Earth next week, the
problem for me, where my dignity and self-respect are concerned, would not be
25. The connections here with poetry here are clear and deep. In much the way the lyrical
subject of a poem is literally constituted by the poem itself, a certain body of work constitutes the
public persona associated with a poet. Consider a possible world in which Alexander Pushkin
biologically survives a cataclysmic event that results in the Russian language’s disappearing
from the face of the earth in 1835. Does Pushkin, the person we know, survive the event? There
seems to be an accessible sense of ‘person’ in which the answer is no; certainly he is not the
same person as he was while the language was alive. He cannot there do the things that in our
world make him who he is, as no one there can recognize his speech acts for what they are.
26. If Pushkin can serve as an example of how significant a role our linguistic choices
play in making us who we are, we might take Nabokov as an example of the sense in which
our identity does not survive translation. Nabokov probably knew English as well as any
native speaker. The history of the autobiographical project realized over the course of Nabokov
(1951; 1954; 1966), however, reveals how acutely aware he was of the fact that his identity was
distributed over two languages. He simply could not do the same things in each language, and
thus, to speakers of the different languages, he appears as different people.
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that I could no longer fly the flag of the Anglophone world, but that I could no
longer exert the kind of control I currently do about how others see me. When
Vladimir Putin chooses to refrain from speaking English in public, it is not simply
because he wishes to avoid making a symbolic concession to the West, it is because
in speaking one’s own language, one can be sure, or at least as sure as anyone
ever is, about what exactly one is doing. Of course, there is a superficial form
of dignity such control allows—the dignity of not accidentally doing something
silly, like saying Either give us a suitcase, or we’ll lick a lawyer when you meant to
say Either give us a ticket, or we’ll call a lawyer in Spanish. But there is a deeper
dignity, too, the dignity of knowing yourself to be the master of a certain domain.
This dignity is lost by people who never have the option of speaking their native
language.
6. Objections and Discussion
If the argument from the previous two sections is successful, it offers a so far
unappreciated reason for caring about language extinction: when a language
disappears, the last speakers lose access to a range of previously possible speech
acts. Since I have argued that autonomy with regard to the speech acts we
realize amounts to autonomy with regard to the social identities we construct for
ourselves, I take this to be a substantial loss, and thus, a reason to care about
preserving languages, as well.
Although there is no space here to defend any specific proposal about what
kinds of language preservation measures might be warranted in which social or
political contexts, or about how to weigh the value of the kind of autonomy I have
described here against other forms of freedom or other basic goods, by considering
two objections to the argument I have presented, I hope to make clear that we
should take the kind of freedom I have described so far quite seriously, and thus
to lay the foundation for future work exploring questions of implementation in
greater detail.
The first objection, which we might call ‘the caviar objection’, is due to an
anonymous referee. Simply put, the objection is this: while everyone might have a
right to eat, no one has a right to eat caviar. Similarly, while everyone might have
a right to expression, no one has the right to express herself with the full degree of
subtlety that I claim is possible for most people only in their native language. To
sharpen the objection, the referee points out that non-native speakers can publish
academic books, participate in prestigious conferences, and even fall in love in
their second or third languages. If someone can do all of this, why should we
care about whether she is also able to select between the possible speech acts she
realizes with the kind of extraordinary fineness of grain that we have described
here?
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The general shape of my response to this objection can be captured by saying
that where the objector sees black caviar, I see brown rice. Of course, I do not
deny that the speech acts I have used as examples here are individuated with
an extraordinary fineness of grain. As I have argued, people track a tremen-
dous variety of information-bearing features when producing and interpreting
speech—features that include the shape and sound of the expressions used, their
truth-conditional contribution and their emotional shading, their history, their
frequency, their prominent uses, and much more. The fact that we can effortlessly
interweave these various features to create structures that are significant along
multiple dimensions at once strikes me as thoroughly remarkable. It is important
to be clear, however, that where ‘extraordinary’ means ‘rare’, there is nothing
extraordinary about this at all.
While great speakers and writers stand out for their particular expressive
gifts, the kind of very precise discriminating capacities I have tried to emphasize
here are hardly confined to their ranks—on the contrary, such capacities form
a piece of the basic inheritance that nearly every person acquires naturally as a
native speaker of a language. What we might call ‘polysemous speech’—speech
that exploits multiple layers of significance at once—is not a frivolous extra,27
bolted on for decoration over the structures that allow us to perform the truly
fundamental linguistic tasks like telling one another how many potatoes are
left, or whether predators are nearby. Polysemous speech, and the fine-grained
discriminatory capacities that underlie it are, as I see things, completely central
pieces of our linguistic lives, and they allow us a degree of control over one of
our central linguistic activities, that is, the structuring of our social relationships,
that would otherwise be impossible.
Presumably no one will deny that it is possible to live a good life without
living in a linguistic environment in which you are able to exert the degree of
27. I suspect that some of the apparent force behind the caviar objection is due to the fact
that taken individually, each of the examples I have offered here of language-specific speech
acts might seem frivolous. So, for example, it is hard to think that my expressive autonomy
is undermined in an important way if changing circumstances make it impossible for me to
continue to rhyme ‘Trump’ with ‘chump’ (say), or that a snickering jerk has grounds to demand
redress if it should become impossible to use ‘niggardly’ to make the kind of obnoxious point
described by O’Hehir above on page 318.
To concede that any one of the particular speech acts a certain language makes available
could be given up without that sacrifice amounting to something of significance, however, is
not to concede that the same holds of their sum. On the view I have described here, our public
personalities are largely constituted by the decisions we make about how to navigate through
the space of options our language makes available to us. Although I acknowledge that much
more would have to be said about what a public personality is and how exactly the words we
use contribute to shaping one, I hope the basic idea will be clear enough to make appreciable
the kind of thing that is at stake. If you lose access to your native language, you lose access to
all of the particularities and patterns of expression that make your voice what it is, and you
thus lose access to a way of being you.
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control a native speaker does over how you present yourself to those around
you. The standard of being able to live a good life, however, is not obviously the
standard that should be applied in determining whether something involves a
considerable sacrifice, or in determining whether people should be expected to
agree to a social or political order that would require their doing it. If someone
chooses to live in a second or third language, she chooses to have less control over
the speech acts she realizes, and thus over her social identity, than nearly every
human throughout history has had.28 If we require someone to live in a second
or third language, we require them to have less control over the speech acts they
realize, and thus over their social identity, than nearly every human throughout
history has had.
A musical analogy can help to bring this point out in a way the comparison
between rice and caviar does not. Imagine that every one of us is born with the
musical gifts of a piano prodigy. We grow up in a community where everyone we
know is constantly playing incredibly rich and expressive music, and in which the
structure of our social relationships is substantially the product of those musical
interactions. Now imagine that one day, someone takes your piano away and
hands you a tin whistle. If you are lucky—and most of us, for what it is worth, are
not—your inherent talent for the piano generalizes, and you quickly turn into a
solid whistler. In this scenario, you might be able to do pretty well in interactions
with pianists, but there is no question that you are condemned for the rest of your
life to play in a much lower resolution than everyone else. The reduction in your
space of expressive possibilities here seems especially lamentable given that you
have this incredible piano music inside you, this latent expressive capability that
now, no one can ever recognize.29
The second objection, which two referees raise versions of, concerns the
question of how far the kinds of reasons for language preservation that I have
argued for here are likely to extend in time. As one referee frames the objection,
someone might grant that access to your native language is something that you
have a fundamental interest in—based on the role your language plays in shaping
your social identity—but deny that this provides any reason to think that your
28. By ‘control over your social identity’ here I mean just in the sense in which we shape
our social personas by means of our words. There are other factors that contribute to the public
identities we take on that I imagine for much of history were even further outside of most
people’s control than they are today, like factors involving racialization, class status, and so on.
29. Consider counterfactual Pushkin again. In a scenario in which Russian is set to
disappear from the face of the Earth forever, surely it will be cold comfort for him to know that
he will be able to continue to attend conferences and even fall in love with someone who speaks
French. I think we are all more like Pushkin than the objector seems to. While our productions
may not have the aesthetic value that his do, they are what make us who we are. Whether you
want to be a stand-up comedian, or a journalist, or the local character down at the pub who
tells a good story, or a grandparent with a wise folksy way, the way you talk is who you are.
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language should be preserved for future generations. Another referee illustrates
the point with regard to a hypothetical case in which an Anglophone government
moves to assimilate future Québécois by progressively moving future generations
away from French and towards English. If the project is realized carefully enough,
there will never be a person who finds herself without a native language, and
thus, there will never be a person who could complain that her right to social
self-determination with the adroitness of a native speaker has been infringed.
The first point to make in response to this objection is that even if we accept it
at face value and concede that the considerations advanced here only apply to
current and not future speakers of a language, it would leave the most substantial
piece of the conclusion we have argued for here standing. The basic aim of the
present paper is to show that it is useful to see language extinction as undercutting
the autonomy of speakers of the languages that are threatened. The space of
speech acts that we have access to when speaking our heritage language is a
space that cannot be replicated in other languages, and indeed, the degree of
control that we exert when speaking our heritage language is a degree that cannot
generally be had when speaking a second language. I take it that this by itself
provides a significant new kind of ground for claims about language protection
and preservation.
As a matter of fact, however, it is difficult to imagine scenarios in which
the interest current speakers have in being connected to their native speech
communities could be protected in a way that will not also generate obligations
that persist through time. Consider the scenario the referee describes above. Even
if we set aside questions about whether there could be defensible reasons for
implementing a curriculum expressly designed to assimilate a linguistic minority,
it is hardly clear that the kids in this case will be ok as French fades and disappears.
Of course, someone raised as a fully-bilingual speaker of French and English
would be better off in a future society in which only English is spoken than a
monolingual French speaker would be, or than an adult student of English as a
second language. The bilingual person, after all, still has access to a linguistic
community in which she counts as a fully-empowered member.
If these bilingual students are raised as native French speakers by Francophone
parents, however, it seems likely that the kind of argument I have given here
will go through for them, as well. There are things these students can do when
speaking French that they cannot do when speaking English. If what I have said
here about the role speech acts play in constituting a person’s social identity is
on roughly the right track, these people will end up with a substantial interest in
preserving access to their Francophone communities. Without such access, they
will be unable to be recognized, as it were, as the people they are. Since every
generation will have a significant interest in sharing a native language with their
children, and children an interest in sharing their parents’ language, the kinds of
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claims to which linguistic identity gives rise are likely to endure through time.30
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I have claimed that liberal concerns about the value of autonomy
can be used to motivate an argument for language preservation. Instead of trying
to show that an agent’s language shapes her possible life paths, in the sense
of Kymlicka’s ‘context of choice’, I have recommended focusing our attention
on a different space of possibilities: the space of possible speech acts an agent
might realize. I argued that autonomy with regard to speech acts amounts to
autonomy with regard to the social identities we construct for ourselves. Since
different languages make different ranges of speech acts possible, insofar as we
are concerned that people be free to choose their social identities, we should be
concerned that they be free to speak (and be understood in) their native languages.
Of course, showing that we ought to take the question of language preser-
vation seriously is not equivalent to showing that the government should open
different schools to cater to people who speak different native languages. It does
not mean that we should pay money to speakers of minority languages, or that
we show more foreign language films, or support their production, or anything
else. Questions about what concrete policies might be defensible on the basis of
the kind of argument I have presented here are questions for another day, as are
questions about how to weigh the value of the kind of autonomy I have described
against other forms of freedom or other basic goods. Nevertheless, I hope this
paper will go some way towards establishing a point that I think has not been
made clearly in the literature so far: there is an important sense of freedom that
depends on our access to a community within which we can determine the way
we present ourselves in the way that only our native language allows us to do.
In keeping with the aim of highlighting areas in which more dialogue between
philosophers working in language, ethics, and politics might be fruitful, I would
like to close the paper by briefly pointing to some ways in which this project
might be developed in the future. One of those, raised by an anonymous referee,
concerns the extent to which the kinds of considerations offered here in support
of claims about the preservation of languages might apply as well to claims about
the significance of dialects or sub-dialects.
30. Of course, I do not mean that children everywhere do or even should care about
learning their parents’ languages (even if there might be a sense in which they have an interest
in doing so), or that parents everywhere care that their children become native speakers of
their languages. In many cases involving migration, a language will not be transmitted across
generations. In many cases this may be, on balance, an acceptable outcome, even if there are
reasons to think that something valuable would be preserved if the language involved endured
among the people in question.
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While I think the point I have tried to press comes out most clearly in the case
of languages, I suspect that much of what I have said will apply to, for example,
regional dialects and the dialects associated with particular subcultures, as well.
On the face of things, it seems plausible to think that speakers of a particular
dialect will sometimes have access to speech act possibilities that speakers of
other dialects do not. Depending on the position speakers of that dialect occupy
within the broader society, it might turn out that the differences are differences
that are especially significant where questions of social identity are concerned. So,
the kind of argument given here might well offer reasons to care about preserving
or protecting variations in linguistic practice even within a single language.
Even if we eventually decide that dialects, sub-dialects, or the particular argot
spoken by a particular group at a particular time do not deserve the same kinds
of protections that a language does, there might nevertheless turn out to be
interesting social or political consequences that follow from recognizing the role
the dialects play in allowing people to present themselves in a certain way. I
alluded earlier to the value some theorists have found in the way marginalized
groups reclaim slurring expressions used to target them; reclamation provides
one model for how dialectical variation might be socially important. Recent work
on multiculturalism offers other potentially relevant models, too. If, for example,
as Jeffers has it, “projects of cultural preservation [can be] a form of resistance”
(2015: 220) to colonialism, racism, and other forms of oppression, then so, perhaps,
might speaking a particular language or dialect.
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